Article on elections, violence and media, from the Nordic Africa Institute

Elections, Violence and Ethnicity in Kenyan Media

February 22, 2013

By Cecilia Bäcklander, independent journalist and film maker

The Kenyan press is outspoken and reports habitually on corruption, power struggles and politics. But there is one topic where strict self-censorship applies: ethnicity.

Self-censorship is applied to avoid inciting trouble. The ethical rules therefore include using ethnic identity only in positive ways and in connection with uncontroversial cultural expressions.

The international press had quite a different approach. It raised the ethnic background of the clashes and described Kenya as a country where tribal conflict had erupted into near-civil war.

New general elections are now coming up in Kenya. The last elections in December 2007 provoked an extensive wave of violence that shook the country and worsened the ethnic conflicts.

The Kenyan press is outspoken and reports habitually on corruption, power struggles and politics. But there is one topic where strict self-censorship applies: ethnicity.

Ethnic identity is very important in Kenya with over 40 tribes. Kenyans are proud to use the word ‘tribe’ to describe their background. But ethnicity is also an inherent explosive force. Kenyans classify their compatriots by ethnic identity. One’s own group is important as a safety net, one has a common language, and the overwhelming majority vote with ‘ethnic loyalty’ in political elections.

The Kenyan press has adjusted to a safety principle. Self-censorship is applied to avoid inciting trouble. The ethical rules therefore include using ethnic identity only in positive ways and in connection with uncontroversial cultural expressions.

New general elections are now coming up in Kenya. The last elections in December 2007 provoked an extensive wave of violence that shook the country and worsened the ethnic conflicts.

The Belgian researcher Roel Coesemans has studied the international and Kenyan press coverage of the crisis following the last elections. The international newspapers were the leading ones in the UK and USA. The Kenyan papers were the two largest and most influential ones – the Daily Nation and The East Africa Standard.

The Kenyan press is important, especially in urban areas. Every copy is read by several people. Many Kenyans are passionately interested in stories about political wheeling and dealing, not least because they are interpreted with an ethnic perspective – who is fooling whom, who is successful? Politics is focused on persons, not on issues or ideology.

Coesemans studied the reporting on the violent conflicts that broke out when the 2007 election results were announced and the incumbent president Mwai Kibaki was pronounced as winner and then in a coup-like way was sworn in for a new term. Later scrutiny has revealed fraud in both of the main contenders’ camps.

Over 1200 people were killed during the crisis and over half a million were displaced. The Kenyans had confidence in the voting after a fair election in 2002 and a referendum in 2005. But in 2007, a dismayed public followed the brutal and deadly violence on TV and in the press. The result was a lingering trauma.

The Kenyan justice system has not been able to prosecute anyone as responsible for this. Two leading politicians have been indicted by the International Criminal Court in The Hague for crimes against humanity. This has not prevented them from standing in the presidential election in March.

Ethnic conflict

President Kibaki belongs to the largest ethnic group, Kikuyu, which has been in power for most of the 50 years of independence, while amassing vast wealth in land and corporate holdings. This does not mean that all Kikuyu are well-off –Kikuyus are both among the richest and some of the poorest Kenyans. They inhabit mainly the Central area around  Nairobi, but have also been resettled in other parts of the country as part of a land reform.

The main opposition leader Raila Odinga is a Luo, one of the four main ethnic groups. Odinga has been in prison for years as an opposition politician, but he is also a successful businessman and the son of the political opponent of Kenya’s first president, Jomo Kenyatta.

The Kikuyu-Luo conflict dates back to the post-independence era[1]  and even before then. In the 2007 election, Odinga had gathered support from a coalition of Luo, Luhyaand Kalenjin in western Kenya and in the vast Rift Valley area. The Kalenjin are lumped together as a ‘tribe’, but are in reality composed of various ethnic groups with different languages. If Kibaki symbolised central power and wealth, Odinga was seen as representing the regions and the poor.

In Rift Valley, the Kikuyu are regarded by many as strangers and settlers, even though they may have lived in the region for a long time. Land is scarce and poverty extensive and both local and national politicians have provoked antagonism before previous elections, in order to gain votes and incite fear. They have not allowed tolerance to prevail.

When the Kikuyu in Rift Valley were attacked by a mob of Kalenjin and other groups 2007-2008, the main Kenyan newspapers were very careful not to mention the ethnicity of either victims or perpetrators, in accordance with their ethical rules. After the first wave of violence against presumed Kibaki supporters – i.e.Kikuyu – there were counterattacks from notorious armed gangs with roots in Kikuyu nationalism with alleged support from circles close to the president.

The local press remained discreet, which may seem decent and responsible. According to Coesemans, however, the effect was rather insidious; the readers might get a sense of something being swept under the rug. A relevant observation is that Kenyans can understand ethnic patterns from the names of places of incidents and persons interviewed. Thus, there was a subtext that virtually shouted out the ethnicity of both victims and perpetrators.

Yet, the Kenyan papers refrained from putting ethnicity in the context as an explanatory factor of the violence. Instead, it was portrayed as eruptions of social and political conflicts or even as merely criminal acts. This self-censorship left the readers to their own interpretations, where ethnic factors undoubtedly were ever present since it is such a dominating part of Kenyans’ image of their country’s reality. But on the whole, the leading newspapers managed to maintain their composure and report in a balanced way, according to Coesemans.

Local radio stations, however, do raise ethnicity. A program host in Rift Valley is under indictment in The Hague as accessory to crimes against humanity after having broadcast hate propaganda (“eradicate the weeds”) and coded messages, reminiscent of the radio broadcasts unleashing the genocide in Rwanda 1994.

The international press had quite a different approach. It raised the ethnic background of the clashes and described Kenya as a country where tribal conflict had erupted into near-civil war. These antagonisms were sometimes portrayed as ancient although they are based more on contemporary disputes over material resources and political power.

The narrative of tribal war and ethnic conflict was a simple way of explaining the events to international readers. Issues of land, historical injustices, political favouritism, migration and business cycles were, according to Coesemans, given a minor role as causes of the crisis, and so was the widespread discontent with electoral fraud – and the description of an African country reverted comfortably to the old stereotypes.

Kenya has adopted a new constitution after more than 15 years of debate and an extensive effort of popular education. Now, on 4 March, there will be new general elections. The ethnic question seems to be on everyone’s mind, if not on the agenda of the local media. But politicians engaged in ‘hate speech’ have begun to be prosecuted, and this is reported by the press.

Women’s representation has increased even in the most backward and traditional parts of the country. The economy is progressing. There are many positive signs, but there is an evident fear of what power-hungry politicians might kick up around the election. Which ethnic strings will be played this time? The media face a difficult but incredibly important task.

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This article has been updated and translated by the Editor from the original Swedish text read by the author on the Radio Sweden programme “OBS!”.

Cecilia´s article on Muslim protests in Ethiopia

Muslims persecuted in Ethiopia

December 19, 2012

By Cecilia Bäcklander, independent journalist and film maker

Ever since the 2005 election with its success for the opposition, the regime has taken a hard line with increasingly harsh oppression. There are armed rebel groups in the South-East, but they are divided and marginal.

A substantial discontent among the Ethiopian Muslims could bring a very different threat to the regime. The Muslims are about one third of the population; to challenge this group could have far-reaching consequences.

The Muslim protest movement is not only some angry young men. They are young and old, women and men. They can spread the word and have access to information from others in a way that had been hitherto unknown in authoritarian Ethiopia.

The heavy-handedness and insensitivity of the government risk radicalizing the movement and open up for consequences that could threaten the cohesion of the country.

There has not been much news from Ethiopia in the Swedish media after the release of two jailed Swedish journalists in September. But they are not the only ones accused of terrorism in the country.

Most of the opposition in Ethiopia disappeared after the 2005 elections – many have gone into exile, others are in jail. But lately, the Muslims in the country have begun to protest. They are 30 per cent of the total population of Ethiopia, and they rarely belong to the highlands elite. The regime is afraid of extremism and has tried to control who is elected to what position in the Muslim congregations.

This has led to protests with people killed and jailed. Many Muslims feel persecuted and fear being seen as suspects. Recently, 29 Ethiopian Muslim leaders were charged with terrorism under the same law used to convict the Swedish journalists.

Ethiopia has an extensive and thorough system for control of the population. There is a famous account by Ryszcard Kapucinski about how the various security services of Emperor Haile Selassie were monitoring each other.

The military dictatorship in power between 1974 and 1991 refined the control of the population through an administrative division of all inhabitants in so-called kebeles, which allowed no one to slip through the net. This division was introduced to manage the land reform, but it also served other purposes.

The current regime has maintained this structure. It contributes to making Ethiopia a more secure country than its neighbours since it provides a social control of criminality.Kebeles have a socio-economic function benefitting poor people. But they can also check oppositional ideas and activities.

Ever since the 2005 election with its success for the opposition, the regime has taken a hard line with increasingly harsh oppression. The official opposition has largely been crushed; its activists are either in exile or in jail. The country’s anti-terrorism laws have facilitated repression of everything that is seen as a threat.

There are armed rebel groups in the Somali region and among the Oromo – the largest ethno-linguistic group in Ethiopia – and the Afar near the border with Eritrea, but they are divided and marginal.

However, a substantial discontent among the Ethiopian Muslims could bring a very different threat to the regime. The Muslims are about one third of the population; to challenge this group could have far-reaching consequences.

It started a year ago. The government asserted that religious extremists were trying to take control of the Muslim congregations in the country and, by extension, to overthrow the secular state. The authorities demanded that the elections to the Muslim high council should be managed by the kebeles and not by the mosques. Some 50 teachers at the principal Muslim school Awoliyah were dismissed and the school was accused of being a breeding ground for radical Islam.

The government tried in various ways to promote the introduction of Al Ahbash, a pluralistic and moderate version of Islam that is common in Lebanon, but alien for most Ethiopian Muslims who are adherents of Sufi Islam. Ethiopia’s constitution guarantees religious freedom.

In the last year, Muslim group have held protest meetings across the country against the government’s interference in religious matters. The government accuses the dissidents of being led by extremists and has several times responded with arrests and deadly violence against peaceful demonstrators; and as stated above, 29 Muslims are now in court accused of terrorism.

As it were, one of the accused is married to a government minister, who was dismissed the other day for having critiqued the indictment.

Ethiopia has a crucial role in the conflict-ridden Horn of Africa. Addis Ababa is the seat of the African Union and thus the capital of Africa. Ethiopia with its 85 million inhabitants is the regional big power and closely allied with the United States in the war against terror. Ethiopia’s military are fighting the Al Qaeda-linked Al Shabaab in Somalia. There is obviously a fear of radical Islam.

However, the Muslim protests have been peaceful. It could be that the government is fighting a bogey, creating a security problem where there was none, and being guided by an irrational suspicion of Muslims.

The Muslim leaders now on trial assert that they want a dialogue with the government. But they also state that the protests will continue until the interference in their religious affairs stops.

Virtually all people I asked during a recent visit to Addis Ababa, from oppositional bloggers to taxi drivers, stress that the Muslim protests have been peaceful. They want to be left alone with their religion, in full accordance with the Ethiopian constitution.

I heard only a few voices expressing support of the government’s actions to keep an eye on the Muslims because they wanted to introduce Sharia laws and had so many children that they would soon become the majority.

Such voices are the exception. There is a strong sense of pride in Ethiopia over the fact that different ethnic groups have since long co-existed peacefully with each other.

The editor of a magazine affirmed that there were two things you could not write about: corruption in high quarters and the Muslim protests. But on the social media the discussion is vivid. It is hard for the authorities to keep up – Facebook pages are being blocked at a rapid pace but new ones keep popping up. Furtively taken photos are spread around. There is growing anger.

The Muslim protest movement is not only some angry young men. They are young and old, women and men. They can spread the word and have access to information from others in a way that had been hitherto unknown in authoritarian Ethiopia. The heavy-handedness and insensitivity of the government risk radicalizing the movement and open up for consequences that could threaten the cohesion of the country.

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This article has been abridged and translated by the editor from the original Swedishtext read by the author on the Radio Sweden programme “OBS!”.

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Cecilia´s article on South Sudan

Earth, Blood and Oil

Will South Sudan face a better future?

November 5, 2012

By Cecilia Bäcklander, independent journalist and film maker

When South Sudan became independent last year, the population had great expectations on the benefits of freedom. They are suffering from conflict, corruption, illiteracy, and lack of roads, schools, clinics and jobs.

These are all enormous obstacles for forming a new society with its own institutions. But most of Sudan’s oil deposits accrued to South Sudan at partition, which can be used to finance state expenditures.

The lasting armed conflict with Sudan has dominated the first year of independence. No oil has been produced since January. Now the two governments have reached agreement to restart production and exports.

In the short run, the oil stoppage has created turmoil. But perhaps this will make South Sudan recognize its vulnerability and seriously embark on diversification, taking advantage of its vast fertile but idle lands.

On 9 July 2011, South Sudan became the newest nation of the world after a well-managed referendum in which 98 per cent of the population voted for independence from Sudan. The referendum had been stipulated in a peace agreement in 2005 between the government in Khartoum and the rebel movement SPLM (Sudan People´s Liberation Movement).

Independence is non-reversible. It was preceded by several decades of armed conflict between the ruling Arab Muslims in the North and the black ethnic groups with Christian or traditional religions in the South. In the middle of the fighting were the large oil deposits.

The blessing and curse of oil

Three quarters of the oil deposits are on South Sudan’s territory, but the refineries are in Sudan, and  all the pipelines go there. The countries did not agree on pricing and in January, South Sudan stopped all production and shipments. The oil was not pumped, nothing was delivered and no revenues received.

Since 98 per cent of South Sudan’s state revenues come from oil, this was equivalent to a financial meltdown. Yet, this measure had the support of the population. It is seen as asserting the nation’s rights against the exploiters in the North.

Sudan also was hard hit by the oil stoppage. Price hikes and spending cuts set off protests against the régime. The lack of diversification with agricultural and industrial development became obvious also in Sudan.

A month ago, the two Presidents Salva Kiir of South Sudan and Omar al Bashir of Sudan swallowed their pride at the negotiations led by the African Union. Oil production and shipments are to be resumed successively during the last part of 2012.

There is an abysmal distrust between the two states, but they cannot manage without cooperation. At least not for a long time yet.

South Sudan has for some time been negotiating with Kenya about constructing a pipeline to the port of Lamu. Kenya has discovered oil in the region bordering South Sudan, whose dependence on Sudan perhaps could thus be broken.

Discussions are also under way about a pipeline to Djibouti via Ethiopia. But all this takes time; investors have to be found. Chinese companies hesitate, being deeply involved in the oil industry in both Sudan and South Sudan.

Also, oil is also a finite resource. There is speculation about how long the wells of South Sudan could last; 5-10 years with full capacity exploration and then declining until 2035 is the current estimate. But perhaps there will be new findings. Diversification will be required anyway.

Land and power
South Sudan supposedly has enough unutilised land to potentially supply all of Sub-Saharan Africa with food. But there is virtually no cultivation, and no farmers to be seen. There used to be small-scale farmers, but they were bombed together into ambulating villages and the farmers became soldiers.

Nomadic groups survive on their cattle, but there is famine every year and lots of weapons in circulation after the many war years. Cattle-raids on neighbours and attacks to ward off enemies have become more frequent after independence.

Parts of the long border between Sudan and South Sudan have not been regularized by treaty and some regions are disputed. Sudan is attacking groups in its South Kordofan and Blue Nile provinces, burning villages, killing and driving off the people. Rebels with roots in the SPLA in the South are resisting. The population is fleeing to South Sudan and its refugee camps.

These scorched earth tactics are reminiscent of the strategy from the civil war in the 90s, when the government army devastated large areas in the South and chased away the survivors in order to defeat the rebel movement SPLM. Only the strongest survived unthinkable hardship and made it over the borders with Ethiopia and Kenya. Most of them were young boys who came to be called ‘the lost boys’; we can read about them in the book What is the What by Dave Eggers.

According to the UN, there are hundreds of thousands of people in the conflict areas lacking everything, including water. The World Food Program plans to deliver food to 2.7 million people this year – in a country with a total population of only 9 million.

At independence, there were 1-2 million South Sudanese in the North, in Sudan. They have no citizens’ rights although many of them were born there. Several hundred thousand of them have crossed the border into South Sudan for an uncertain future; others are in a limbo, waiting for identity documents from South Sudan.

The agreement in September 2012 between the South and the North stipulated a demilitarized buffer zone of 10 km along the new border and also the application of so-called soft borders in order to have an end to the fighting. The oil-rich and disputed Abyie province was not included in the agreement.

The AU wants to hold a referendum there in 2013. If the stationary residents of Abyie are allowed to vote on their national affiliation, the majority is likely to vote for becoming a province in South Sudan, and the nomadic groups from the North, who traditionally use the pastures there for grazing, will be overruled. This can hardly happen in a peaceful way and it is doubtful whether AU will be able to force a referendum to be held.

Power and corruption

Before partition, Sudan was ranked as number 177 of 182 countries in the 2011 corruption report from Transparency International (North Korea and Somalia were at the bottom of the list).

Corruption in the ruling SPLM is widespread and there were many who grabbed common resources during the transition years between the peace agreement in 2005 and independence. Since the oil revenues stopped, President Salva Kiir has attacked corruption and tried to recover what has been swindled away.

In May, he wrote a letter to 75 senior officials, calling on them to return 4 billion dollars, which he implied had been stolen through corruption since the signing of the peace agreement. Most of the money is believed to have been used i.a. to acquire real estate abroad, paid in cash. “When we came to power we forgot what we fought for and started enriching ourselves”, the President wrote, promising amnesty for sinners who redeem their debt.

The Minister for Information claims that 60 million dollars have been repaid so far. Sceptics point to the long-standing example of neighbouring Kenya, which shows that corruption fighters disappear out of the country, resign or get summarily fired. New anti-corruption generals are appointed but no money is ever returned and impunity is total.

And in South Sudan, as in Kenya, there is no doubt about the biggest crooks sitting closest to the power. Even the President is not trying to hide that.

One of the problems of the government is paying salaries to the over-dimensioned army, which is where most of the Treasury spending goes. The army is the dominating force in South Sudan after so many years of war and a hungry and disgruntled giant army could threaten any development and security.

South Sudan has vast unutilised lands
South Sudan has vast lands, largely unutilised, but only 100 km of tarred roads. Despite the vast tracts of green land, everything is imported. After the peace agreement of 2005, a sort of gold rush started from the neighbouring countries Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia and from international organizations and investors.

Kenyans and Ugandans run the service and transport sectors. What is needed now is creating a South Sudanese economy where investments in agriculture are encouraged. It is really about starting from scratch, but the potential is great.

Nomadic herdsmen will not develop agriculture. In the worst case they will be seen as obstacles to development. And we are likely to get a debate about neo-colonization and land grabbing if foreign investors enter the stage.

The government in South Sudan needs to attract the investors, while also keeping control over activities and conditions in order to ensure that agricultural development will benefit the poor and partly starving population.  But not only investors need to be kept under control. Corruption is an infection that can easily lead to chronic heart disease in an administration entrusted with managing the oil billions.

Are the leaders capable of guiding the creation of a better South Sudan?  So far, over a year into independence, this question cannot be answered in the affirmative. But clearly, South Sudan will face a better future. Good contacts, both economic and political, with neighbouring countries with growing economies like Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia vouch for it.

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The original Swedish version of this article was published at Bistandsdebatten.se

Review of book on Ethiopia

Ethiopia, the last two Frontiers

The latest book by leading area scholar

May 29, 2012

By Cecilia Bäcklander, journalist and TV producer, Stockholm, Sweden

Ethiopia is populated by highlanders who historically have been part of the state formation and whose rulers have subjugated a number of nationalities in the highland periphery and in the surrounding lowlands.

This struggle between the centre and the periphery is a momentous issue for the country. The three regimes that have ruled the country during the last hundred years have resorted to military power and violence to control the territory and extract its resources.

About 12 % of Ethiopia’s population are nomads and their pasture-lands make up more than half of the area of the country. They are barring the way of development and development will annihilate them – brutally and at breakneck speed.

The only solution is to create a nation for all Ethiopians. Two regimes fell while defending the interests of the central power, and the third and present had to give up Eritrea, thus incurring the bitterness of all Ethiopian nationalists.

What do we think we know about Ethiopia? Well, Ethiopia is a proud highland realm, a Christian kingdom with historical roots from King Solomon and the Queen of Sheba, with its own alphabet and written history; an African country that was never colonized, with a central power that even in 1896 could mobilize an army of 100,000 soldiers with 200,000 muskets and defeat the Italian army in the battle of Adua. 

And most of this is true. But according to John Markakis, Greek historian and political scientist who spent a lifetime studying Ethiopia and its neighbours on the Horn of Africa, there is an even more important truth. 

And that is the fact that the state of Ethiopia is constituted by highland peoples who historically have been part of the state formation and whose rulers have subjugated a number of nationalities in the highland periphery and in the surrounding lowlands. 

This struggle between the centre and the periphery is a momentous issue for the country. In the opinion of Markakis, the three regimes that have ruled the country during the last hundred years have been incapable of understanding the complexity of the country, resorting instead to military power and violence to control the territory and extract its resources. 

Whether the centre has been ruled by an autocratic and divine emperor like Haile Selassie, or by a Marxist military dictator like Mengistu Haile Mariam, or by the current authoritarian government of Meles Zenawi – the ruling clique has continuously prevented all economic and political pluralism for the subjugated peoples. The result is conflict and revolts that inhibit economic development.

The latest book by John Markakis entitled Ethiopia, the last two Frontiers (James Currey, Woodbridge 2011) is impressive but hard to penetrate due to its wealth of knowledge and details.   

Markakis reviews some fifty ethnic groups and reports on at least twice as many liberation movements and other political groups; he leaves no stone unturned in exposing the conflicts that the shaping of a genuine Ethiopian nation has brought about and will need to confront. 

The two frontiers he refers to in the book title are democratization and integration of the subjugated lowland areas. Markakis does not like what he sees. He considers the opposition that was allowed to work in a short, democratic opening before the elections of 2005, albeit divided, just as highland nationalistic as the regime. It would have faced exactly the same problems if it had come to power. 

The present regime springs from the Tigray Liberation Front, which overthrew the Mengistu government in 1991. But – in contrast with many others – Markakis does not see it as representing narrow ethnic interests. It simply represents the traditional central power in the highlands with its two major ethnic groups: the Amharas and the Tigrays. 

He further asserts – also in contrast with the majority of the opposition and a large number of international analysts – that the last 20 years of transformation of Ethiopia into an ethnic-based federal state is a necessary reform. 

No matter how many obstacles it has met concerning borderlines, internal conflicts, lack of local resources and educated people, favouring of local elites and endless other problems, Markakis maintains that it was necessary. But it has to be carried out in such a way that a true representation can be achieved with all ethnic groups getting a fair chance to participate in the country’s development. 

At the core is, of course, the land issue. It is the earth which has to feed the growing population. All land is state property; it is leased out or controlled traditionally and used in different ways, but importantly, it is not private. 

The proponents of privatization and a capitalist development, i.e. the most hawkish nationalists in the opposition, have so far not gained a hearing, of which Markakis approves. 

But somehow the arable land shortage in the densely populated highlands has to be resolved. Before, the landless migrated to the lowlands, but with the new ethnic federalism this is made more difficult and tends to create new conflicts. 

Moreover, the government considers the land in the outlying areas as the engine of economic development. It is leased out in a large scale at low cost to foreign companies for cultivation of rice, sugar and other crops for domestic consumption and for export. Energy crops are to yield Dollars, Euros and Yen. 

But, says Markakis, no one seriously believes that the nomads and subsistence farmers in the lowlands will become plantation workers. These jobs will be taken by migrant labour. The water, the pastures and the traditional ways of life will be destroyed. 

About 12 % of Ethiopia’s population are nomads and their pasture-lands make up more than half of the area of the country. They are barring the way of development – here as elsewhere – and development will annihilate them. This may eventually be inevitable, but now it will happen brutally, at breakneck speed. 

I lived in the capital Addis Abeba for some years in the 80s, and my mind was impressed by the hegemonic perception of Ethiopia as one country. When reading Markakis, I’m more inclined to think of the Roman Empire and its history of constantly subjugating new peoples and expand its frontiers. I would like to bring his book on a tour along the borders of Ethiopia in order to understand the country better. 

It is a relief that Markakis does not consider Ethiopian development to be driven by external forces. He of course describes the revolving door policies from WWII up to the fall of the Soviet Union, when first USA and then USSR became allies of the Ethiopian rulers and armed them to the teeth, and thus helped them subdue the border area populations. 

He also explains how the War on Terror has once again created close links between Ethiopia and the USA. But the picture he shows of Ethiopia is a nation whose rulers have not been the puppets of others but have promoted their own interests. And these interests are entirely those of the ruling clique in the highlands. 

But it will require increasing superiority of forces to maintain control, according to Markakis. The only solution is to create a nation for all Ethiopians. Two regimes fell while defending the interests of the central power, and the third and present had to give up Eritrea, thus incurring the bitterness of all Ethiopian nationalists. 

A true federalism would in the view of Markakis also mean autonomy for the Somali region – the area where two Swedish journalists were arrested last year. It’s been decades since gas and oil companies started prospecting in the rebellious Ogaden area, but none has yet managed to exploit the resources, despite the near occupation of the central power. 

Markakis knows many members of the present Ethiopian government; several have been his students. He said in an interview that he hopes they will read the book, but he does not think they will like it. He also expects them to be overthrown in their quest for keeping the status quo. And he sees no alternative regime that is likely to change course.

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A short version of this article was published in Swedish in Sida’s magazine Omvärlden, No. 4, 2012.

Article from SVT Debatt on development cooperation

Economic growth with corruption and inequality

Nordic donors should be concerned and take measures

March 19, 2012

by Bo Göransson, NAI Associate; formerly Special Advisor to the President of the African Development Bank, Swedish Ambassador to Kenya, and Director General of Sida.

A number of countries are now in the rising phase with rapid growth combined with worsening corruption and widening gaps. Some of these countries are major recipients of aid from Sweden and other Nordic countries.

We should be discussing our assessment of this development; we can rejoice and even take pride over the increased growth and poverty reduction, which is the very aim of development cooperation. But the growing corruption and the lack of growth trickling down throughout society and out to the villages should be a matter of concern.

The Swedish minister says we should be handing out improved stoves to poor people. If at least it had been to support local production of improved stoves, or to financially support micro-credits for poor people. No, the poor should get stoves, “more action” is the slogan.

That means disregarding everything about a long-term perspective, sustainability and people’s own responsibility for improving their situation. It means going back at least 50 years in time. It is an embarrassment.

There are two ghosts walking across the world: corruption and inequality. They thrive under the shield of growth that many countries have enjoyed during a number of years, not least the poor countries.

Economic growth in poor countries during the last decade means that the UN Millennium Development Goal of halving poverty by 2015 will be reached even this year. The strongest locomotive is China but there are a number of countries achieving record growth rates. IMF estimates that 7 of the 10 fastest-growing economies in the world are in Africa; thus even Africa is making good progress towards the goal of halving poverty.

The main reasons for this progress are domestic policy reforms, high raw material prices, fewer armed conflicts and widening democracy. But even the poorest countries are subject to the economic policy iron law of the new millennium: the faster the growth, the more corruption increases and the more skewed is the distribution of resources.

There are many factors behind the Arab Spring, but in Tunisia the decisive one was the desperation among the well-educated, yet unemployed youth combined with the blatant and growing corruption among the presidential clique.

The pattern of growing corruption and inequality is global. ‘After us the deluge’ seems to be the motto of the leading financial operators all over the world; in Russia, China, Kenya, USA, Sweden. It is hard to understand that they don’t see the writing on the wall.

Global youth unemployment rates of 10-30 % is a certain prescription for social conflict and instability, and thus lower growth and eventually also diminishing returns of capital.

The élite is cutting off the branch it is sitting on―everything is fine and the branch has not broken yet, and we trust the soothsayer’s recipe for forecasting the weather: it will be the same tomorrow as today. And maybe it will, but not forever. And then everyone will ask dazedly what happened, and why now? The answer is: why not before? 

A number of countries are now in the middle of their rising phase with rapid growth combined with worsening corruption and widening gaps. Some of these countries are major recipients of aid from Sweden and other Nordic countries.

We should be discussing our assessment of this development; we can rejoice and even take pride over the increased growth and poverty reduction, which is the very aim of development cooperation. But the growing corruption and the lack of growth trickling down throughout society and out to the villages should be a matter of concern. 

Some conclusions:

• A given consequence should be that the amounts of aid to these countries is reduced; there is no reason to provide more money where it is already plentiful;
• Another conclusion is to direct aid, even more than before, towards governance reforms and to non-government civil society;
• Increase budget support, which gives the possibility to discuss overall developments, from military spending to health care. Project support ensures finance for a project, but cannot affect how the fungible funds thus released are spent. Budget support goes to the budget as a whole but is not given without conditions, whether to Burkina Faso or Greece.
• A rule of thumb for development cooperation needs to be taken off the shelf: if a country is good at growth, help with distribution. Nowadays, therefore, we should support distribution, for example free basic education and health to support women and children.

And if there are no results and we don’t get a response for our ideas, thoughts, proposals or points of view we should withdraw, orderly. This we did for instance in the late 1990s from Angola, which had resources (oil) but not the will to use them for inclusive development. That kind of decisions can hurt, but they must be a vital part of an active development policy. 

Don’t believe that corruption does not exist―whether here or there. Or that it can be controlled away by aid donors. Studies have shown that corruption and double-dealing is much less frequent with aid funds than with tax and customs revenues. What is important then is to support institutions, civil society and a free press. And to dare to be honest. 

Does anyone believe that Greece will get rid of corruption now that they are receiving more billions in support? Or that Afghanistan will be free of corruption when they receive a large increase of Swedish aid next year? 

Sweden used to consider equality important, also for growth. Nordic societies have been held up as a model by many. It has beyond doubt been successful. We should play an important role in the international debate about the increasing gaps, not least in discussions with our development cooperation partner countries. But we are silent now. 

The Swedish minister has a very different message: our aid must become more concrete. The example given is that we should be handing out improved stoves to poor people. If at least it had been to support the development of local production of improved stoves, or to financially support micro-credits for poor people. No, the poor should get stoves, “more action” is the slogan. 

That means disregarding everything about a long-term perspective, sustainability and people’s own responsibility for improving their situation. It means going back at least 50 years in time. It is an embarrassment.

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