Is Kenya changing?

Nairobi November 21, 2011

Plus ca
change, plus c’est la même chose?
The last decade in Kenya has been dramatic in many
ways. There are two major positive
changes: Economy and Democracy.
The economy has picked up with an average growth or
about 5% which is a radical shift from Moi’s reign when Kenya had 14 years of
stagnating or falling GDP per capita. Probably a sad world record for a country
not being at war. The signs are visible; better roads, more maintenance and not
least luxury houses mushrooming in and around Nairobi. The capital is making huge efforts to become
an attractive center for visitors and residents alike. They have succeeded;
down town Nairobi was a place seldom visited after dark (or even earlier) in
the past. Streetlights now make walking at night safer and the city center is
reasonably clean; partly because of a ban on smoking in Nairobi -a rule
strictly adhered to, no butts on the sidewalks. Bars and cafés are full of people, crime in various
forms certainly exists. But you feel reasonably safe walking around and
enjoying the evening.
The Democracy has taken its turns and twists. But a
new constitution is in place and is implemented in gradual steps. It prescribes
new structures both at local and central levels.. It is a costly Constitution,
with a Senate and Governors and local governing bodies at 47 counties. But more
important than the cost, is the feeling that the people of Kenya are convinced
that they have the power during election
day. That power was grabbed from them in 2007, which caused the Post election
violence, scaring so many, not least Kenyans. The first acid test will be the
elections that according to the Constitution will be held in August next year,
but might be postponed to December.
But there are tendencies, bad in themselves, but also
representing threats to the positive
developments.
Employment is still low, unemployment even worse. The gap
between the rich and the rest is widening. Youth unemployment is a ticking bomb
(also) in Kenya.
The political class looks first and foremost at their
own interest and is absorbed by their internal wrangling. The famine in
northern Kenya is hardly discussed, maybe not even observed, by the leaders.
Not even by media, just as obsessed by the political charades as the politicians.
Corruption is still rampant, there are no signs or
improvement at all. Kenya fared one step better in TI’s assessment of
corruption in the East African countries, but that was the effect of Tanzania
going down rather than Kenya going up. Impunity is the order of the day, now as
before.
Ethnicity is more openly discussed than before, or
rather more observed than before. Some see this as a positive sign. Better talk
about than suppress it. I do not agree. Of course suppression is not the
answer, but focus on ethnicity is certainly not the answer either. It seems
that ethnicity is a card played by the leaders, not necessarily by the people. A
sad observation, if true, but maybe a positive sign?
The war of incursion in Somalia changes the position
of Kenya in the region. The country will now try to be as politically and even militarily
as important as its economic clout admits.
But the operation is a high risk one, and it is doubtful
if the Kenyan people are prepared for a drawn out war with many casualties and
maybe intensified terror attacks, also inside Kenya.
And the question remains, which of the positive and
negative tendencies are likely to be fundamental and structural - or temporary?

The Rich and the Rest

Nairobi November 18, 2011

Forbes Magazine publicizes an annual Rich List. Yesterday they released its list of the 40 richest Africans. Uhuru Kenyatta, the deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, is assessed to be the richest man in Kenya and the 26^th richest person in Africa.

Second on the Kenyan top list is one of president Kibaki’s closest business allies.

Kenyatta is the late Jomo Kenyatta’s youngest son. He is a presidential candidate for the 2012 presidential election. He is also one the 6 Kenyans investigated by the ICC in the Hague for their actions in the post election violence in 2008.

His primary wealth consists of land, acquired during the later part of the colonial time and the first years of independence when the British sold land at very low prices as part of a settlement scheme. It presumably settled more accounts for the rich than land for the poor.

The release of the Forbes report and comments on it are interesting.

The Star is the only newspaper that so far has published the list. Their fairly small commentary does not include raised eyebrows. The wealth of the rich Kenyans are well known, as well as the fact that politics in Kenya is the gateway to fortunes.

Some sources, according to the Star, question the assessment, believing that former president Moi, Jomo Kenyatta’s successor, and his family is even richer.

One political analyst is very clear on the consequences for the run for presidency. I quote: “….the Forbes report can only help Uhuru (Kenyatta) at election time. His biggest selling point will be that he does not need to be corrupt because he is already wealthy”.

Maybe it is naive to be surprised, not of the facts, they are known, but the lack of interest in discussing and questioning. But, knowing the gaps between the rich and the poor in Kenya, knowing that these gaps are widening, knowing that inflation this year is around 20% and all those with incomes are badly hurt, knowing that the disparities were a major reason for the post election violence, and that the gap has widened since then. Finally knowing that these gaps fuel ethnic tension and that the next election is around the corner.

Yes, I am naive.

Eastleigh, Somali quarters in Nairobi

Eastleigh is an area, close to the center of Nairobi, with a very large population coming from Somalia. Many have acquired Kenyan citizenship,some retain their Somali citizenship but with permit to stay, some are there illegally.
Large parts of Eastleigh function as a regular, traditional market, where everything is available, and at fairly low prices. People from all over Nairobi come to shop in Eastleigh.
The streets are busy. Houses and streets are badly kept, Eastleigh has never been of any political importance in Kenya. This has started to change with an MP promoting local interests.

Some things we learned talking to shopkeepers and shoppers in Eastleigh:
Most of the people are Kenyan citizens. Only one said that she was there illegally. There were presumably more, but still a bit surprising that anyone admits it openly.
Everybody said that they supported the Kenyan invasion. Everybody thought that he Kenyan army would defeat al Shabaab.
Some thought that the Kenyan invasion would lead to peace; others did not have such high aspirations, but were content if al Shabaab was beaten.
Many said that they would immediately return to Somalia if peace and order would be established and prevailed. They said some had already returned and that others were eagerly awaiting news from relatives
in order to go.
No one said that they had been looked upon with (more?) suspicion after the invasion – surprising since the Kenyans are complaining about the Somali presence in Kenya. As seen also from the Kenyans view of Eastleigh: A friend told us that she was born in the area but she had not been there for the last 15 years. She called us in the evening; she wanted to check that we were back safe, she feared that we would be kidnapped.

Peace race in Kapenguria

Kapenguria.

November 11, 2011.

Tegla Loroupe is one of Kenya’s most famous runners. She was the first African woman to win NY Marathon, world record holder in both marathon and 10.000 meters.

She comes from an area in northwestern Kenya, where conflicts between local groups have been rampant. The fights are about cattle and land. She has decided to invest her prestige, and some of her prize money, to put an end to that. Her foundation is arranging peace runs in conflict ridden areas, not only in Kenya: Runs have been held in southern Sudan and in Uganda.  She is also setting up an academy for up and coming athletes (=runners).

The academy, at secondary school level and with boarding facilities, is now being constructed; the main buildings are already there. An impressive achievement in a totally forgotten and neglected part of Kenya. She is financially supported by Kenya Airways, a Kenyan bank, and a telephone operator and at least previously by UNDP

The race in Kapenguria was the 10^th in that area. An open field is the centre of events, where all the races (2  km for young people,  10 for warriors and  for women) are flagged off and  finish. 

The people living in the area flank the course, which basically is running up and down the two tarmac roads in Kapenguria. You tend to think it is more up than down; the altitude is 2.000 m.a.s.l.

After the races a bad Kenyan tradition starts; the speeches. Around 17 men and 2 women spoke, I lost count. It lasted 3 hours. Finally the winners were awarded. By that time everybody was exhausted, not by running but by sitting, standing and listening.

Has Tegla been successful? Yes. There are no conflicts in this area between the tribes. That is ascribed to her efforts, which is at least partly true. So the Kapenguria races have been important. In the other area in Kenya where Tegla’s foundation is active, there are no signs of improvement; the run this year had to be cancelled due to an acute conflict.

Tegla is a strong woman with great capacity to convince. She will continue her efforts. If her academy gets up and running (hmm) and becomes financially sustained through scholarships, grants and fees, she will certainly make lasting imprints both for athletes and peace.

Power, politics and hunger (2)

Nairobi November 10, 2011

Al Shabaab was ousted from Mogadishu in October by the AU force Amisom, consisting of
soldiers from Burundi and Uganda, with the support of forces from the Transitional
Federal Government of Somalia. A fragile peace was established in
the capital, torn from fighting and run down from lack of management of basic
facilities and maintenance of public and private property for decades.

Al Shabaab retreated southwards, threatening to come back or to return with new forms or
methods of retaliation. That is not an empty threat; they have made a lethal
attack in Uganda, as a revenge for Uganda’s involvement. And they have come
back, so far in small attacks, but now in the traditionally peaceful and
resilient Kenya. Abduction of tourists and aid workers had the calculated
negative effects on the Kenyan tourist industry, a large earner of foreign
currency.

Kenya retaliated with unexpected force. They invaded southern Somalia
with 3000 ground troops, (including embedded journalists), support from the air
force and deployment of the navy to protect the coast. Since this is the first time that they are at war, it was a surprise move; the Kenyan public did not expect it, nor did the region and, probably not the al Shabaab.

The Kenyan public though, seems to support the move. It is clear that there is as strong resentment
of having a fragile, or rather failed, state as a neighbor. Everything is now
blamed on the Somalis, as many things in Botswana or South Africa is blamed on
the influx of Zimbabweans.

The parliament is endorsing the war. They were not formally consulted prior to the invasion, but had a meeting in camera where, according to reports, no one spoke against the military intervention.

In Nairobi today, there are few signs of the war effort. Daily life seems to continue
undisturbed. Even Eastleigh in Nairobi, dominated by business and Somalis,
seems tranquil, dirty, busy, commercial, - exactly as before. But security is
heightened at public places and car boot sales have been cancelled, which illustrates
an increased awareness of possible threats. In media there are of course
discussions on the ultimate objectives of this effort, and on the viability of
these objectives.

The UN with support from the US (or vice versa?) tried to install peace in Somalia in 1994.
They failed. The Ethiopians ditto in 2006. Why shall a country with much
smaller armed forces succeed?

It is clear what Kenya wants: A neighbor that is in no way a threat to Kenyan industry; be
it beer, cement, oil or tourism. That is why Kenya has been active in hosting
various peace negotiations, to no avail, leading to increased Kenyan frustration.
The objective with the invasion seems to be to create a peaceful buffer zone on
the Somali side of the border. If clan conflicts in Somalia would lead to three
of four separate Somali states, such as Somaliland today and maybe Puntland tomorrow,
this would not be running against the Kenyan interest, as long as they
function. That could also be in the Ethiopian interest; having small and weak
countries as neighbors, rather than a conflict ridden havoc creating larger
Somalia.

The Kenyan incursion in Somalia has also brought the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea
to the surface. Kenya has formally accused Eritrea for supporting al Shabaab,
which Asmara vehemently denies. From Eritreas point of view, the accusations are bad news: They strengthen the links between Kenya and Ethiopia and the Eritrean isolation increases.

The humanitarian crisis continues, even if there are signs that it is not worsening.
The influx to Dadaab has slowed down. But the situation in the camp is very
serious with fear for increased spreading of diseases. International aid organizations
have left after the abduction of aid workers. The ongoing rains might lead to
increased food production next year, if the political situation allows for it.

There are few short term humanitarian crises; their causes are often structural and their
consequences for shattered societies, capacity for food production and weakened
human bodies last long.

Power, politics and hunger (1)

Nairobi, November 9, 2011
A few months ago the famine on the Horn of Africa reached media and attained daily attention
in news and talk shows over the world.
NGOs increased their efforts to raise money and awareness. Governments propped
up their support. Celebrities flocked. Governments and NGOs were as usual
accused of reacting and reaching out too late and slow and simultaneously for
not controlling the distribution of food sufficiently. Also as usual.

Dadaab in northeastern Kenya was the centre of attention; the refugee camp that was
designed for 90.000, and now harbor’s more than half a million Somalis. Mogadishu also saw large influx of starving people from surrounding rural areas. Ethiopia received huge numbers of Somali refugees, on top of their own population that was at risk, roughly 4 millions. Estimates
put possible deaths at 6 digit figures, numbers unheard of for decades and equaling
the death tolls during Pol Pot in Cambodia and the Rwandan genocide.

Focus was initially on the shortfall of rain in the region leading to loss
of grain production and later famine, but it shifted fairly rapidly to the more
political aspects behind the crisis.

Al Shabaab was singled out as the main human factor triggering off the humanitarian
disaster; the large scale suffering. They had controlled central and southern Somalia; they had “taxed” the population, forcibly recruited boys to their militia and controlled important segments of the local production, such as charcoal.

The conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea was seen as one of the crucial factors obviating a long
term solution; Ethiopia had intervened in Somalia in 2006 in collaboration with
the western-backed Transitional Federal Government which gave rise to local
resistance and ultimately to al Shabaab. Eritrea was seen as opposing anything
in Somalia that would be in Ethiopia´s interest, and was thus supporting Al Shabaab in
its fight with TFG.

The situation on the Horn has rapidly changed in recent weeks, with focus on new actors and new
interventions. The limelight is not on the famine, but on the political and
military situation. And the perspective is now regional, not national.

…..to
be continued

Media in Somalia

The changing media landscape in Somalia reflects the
violent and chaotic human and political situation in Somalia during the last
two decades.
In 1991,
before the fall of Barre’s regime, the media was controlled and limited in
scope, circulation and coverage. After 1991 media, various forms of print and
electronic media mushroomed. Some of the features;
Media
inside Somalia is mainly printed press. Small in circulation, a normal figure
is around 500 copies, the biggest has around 5.000. No group in Somalia has
control of the whole territory, and this is also reflected in the media
situation. They are local, clan based and thus political. In recent years many of the small papers are
dying and are being replaced by radio and internet based media.
The growth
of media outside Somali is a direct consequence of the large number of Somalis
that has left the country during the last decades.
These are
all internet based, managed by various clan affiliated groups in the West. They
try to combine news with music and various forms of infotainment. The number of
websites has almost doubled in the last five years.
The degree
of literacy in Somali is a serious limitation for the printed press. Only
around 20% of the Somalis are literate, the figures for Somaliland are higher,
the figures for pastoralist in central and southern Somalia is substantially
lower.
The
diaspora is spread in many countries apart from neighboring Kenya and Ethiopia.
In Sweden around 40.000, in South Africa 60.000 to illustrate. Most of them are
literate and keen to follow developments at home. This means that some of the
internet and diaspora managed media has the diaspora itself as target group,
plus a small elite in Somalia.
In the
collapse of national institutions, Somalia media becomes not only the way to
disseminate news but also de facto the custodian of the Somalia history and its
language, a language where no institution sets standards.
Media and
the journalists are poorly equipped to shoulder these tasks; fragmented,
political and badly trained.
An almost
ironic effect of the lack of national power and institutions is that media is
fairly free. In the region they are regarded as being second only to Kenya in
media freedom. But that is not by design, merely one more illustration of the
country’s default.